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This paper investigates conditions under which market contracting can, despite
contractual incompleteness and renegotiation, ensure efficient investment in relation-
ship specific assets when trade is a continuing process (as in employer-employee and
long-term supply relationships), not the one~ff event studied previously. It considers
two cases, one with investments by only one pazty, the other with investments by both
pazties. The latter suggests an interpretation of Joskow's observations of long-term
coal contracta. The analysis has implications for the ownership of assets, for which
pazty should undertake specific investments, and for the design of damage measures for
breach of contract.1
I. Introdnction
Many economic relationshipa benefit from inveatment in relationship specific
assets or skills that make the value of continuing the relationship greater than the
market alternatives available to the parties involved. Employment relationships may
benefit from specific training and írom employees relocating neaz their work place.
Trade in intermediate goods may benefit from suppliers and purchasers buying equip-
ment specially adapted to the needa of the other. Aa Mazshall (1920) noted, the div-
ision of such quasi-renta is generally determined by bargaining.i But bazgaining over
these quasi-rents can lead to inefficient levela of apecific investments. Once one party
has made a apecific investment, there is potential for the othera to bargaia away some
of the return to that investment because they have become essential for that return to
be generated. And if the investing pazty dces not capture all the return from the
investment, the level of investment will not in general be efficient, see Grout (1984).
Complete long term contracts can, as Becker (1975) recognized, overcome this in-
efficiency but there are good reasona why such contracts cannot always be uaed ia prac-
tice.~ Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978) and Williamson (1985) regard the resulting
inefficiencies as a major reason for taking such relationshipa out of the mazket context
and organizing them within institutions (for example, firma), thus providing a theory of
the extent and atructure of firm organization. Grosaman and Hart (1986) and Hart and
Moore (1988b) have developed this into a theory of ownership of assets.
In this paper we argue that mazket contracting can, despite incompleteness,
lOn page 626, Mazshall ( 1920) discusses the notion of a composite quasi-rent of a firm
and on the following page states "there ia nothin~ but bazgaining to decide the exact
shares in which the excess of its incomin~s over its outgoinga for the time should be
divided between employers and employed.'
~Hazt and Moore ( 1988a) have emphasized two. First, apecifying all the relevant
contingencies in a way that is enforceable in court may be difficult. In pazticular, the
extent of the apecific investments undertaken may be difficult for a court to verify.
Second, a contract can always be renegotiated by mutual consent - the pazties involved
can agree to tear it up and, if they wiah, replace it with an alternative contract.
Anticipation of this acts as a further constraint on drafting because the pazties know
that certain provisions they might make in a contract would never in fact be carried
out. Other recent papers concerned with incomplete lon term contracts are Crawford
(1988), Farrell and Shapiro (1989), Huberman and Kahn ~1988) and Tirole (1986).a
enaure e~cient investment in relationship specific asseta nnder much wider conditions
than ia generally thought provided aome rudimentary loag term contracts are enforce-
able. We are concerned with the economically important sitnation in which trade be-
tween the pazties is potentially a continuing procesa, not jnst a one-0ff event.
Examples of this, for inatance employer~mployee and long term supply relationships,
aze widely discusaed in thie literature. We study two cases, both with only two parties
involved. In the firat, the relationship specific investments are all made by one party.
In that case, esaentially all that is required from the long term contract is that it can
specify enforceable payments conditional on whether the partiea trade with each other,
do not trade with each other, or break off the relationship by committing themselves to
other partners. In effect, courta need only to be able to verify who actually trades
with, or works for, who. Though not always possible, that is, in our view, a rather
weak requirement that should be satis5ed in many practical examplea.
In our second case, both partiea may make relationship apecific investments but,
for any given trading price, theae investments yield benefits only to the pazty making
them. Examples of such investments aze a firm that gets all the productivity gains
from training a worker as long as the worker does not get an increased wage as a result
of training and a public utility that gets all the returna from building a rail line to a
mine mouth as long as the pithead price it pays for coal ie not thereby increased. We
call investments of this type "self inveatments". Not all specific inveatmenta aze self
inveatments. A firm may pay removal expensea to s,n employee. At any given wage, it
is the employee who benefite from that. An employee may think hazd of waya to im-
prove productivity in a factory which merely increase profits unlesa the employee geta a
wage riae. In the case in which both parties make self investments, efficient levels of
inveatment can be achieved even when the levels ot inveatment are not themselves
contractible but it requires rather more of the long term contract than where only one
pazty makes apecific investmenta.
Our resulta derive from a precise analyais of the opportnnities that paztiea to a
continuing relationship have open to them. For attaining efficient inveatment in the3
first of our cases, it is important that the noninvesting party be able to break off the
relationship and trade elsewhere. Thua the availability of opportunities outside the
relationahip is central. This is the opposite of R.ogerson (1984) and Shavell (1984) in
which it is the need for the parties to be free to break off the relationship when aepar-
ation is efficient that is seen as an important reason for the level of investment being
inefficient. It is also the opposite of other implementation and contracting problema
(see, for example, MacLeod and Malcomson (1989)) ia which the opportunity for ageata
to opt out hinders, rather than helps, the achievement of ef5ciency.
This analyais has a number of implications. One concerna ownership. Coasider
the example of slavery. Slavery prevents the slave opting out of the relationship with
the slave owner. Unless the slave owner can always achieve what Williamson calls
consummate performance from the slave, the abaence of that opportunity reducea the
incentive for efficient specific inveatment by the slave owner. For thia reason slavery
may be an inefficient form of ownerahip when specific investments aze important. A
similaz argument can be applied to ownerahip of one firm by another. A second
implication concerns the behaviour of wages. Becker (1975) suggested that the
presence of 5rm specific human capital would result in a rising wage~tenure profile to
reduce quits. Abraham and Fazber (1987) and Altonp and Shakotko (1987) find no
such tenure effects. Our analysis ahowa that, ií all the apecific investments are made
by the firm, a contract to induce efficient inveatment would have the employee eazning
a wage equal to the mazket wage outside the relationahip, which ia entirely consiatent
with those findings. Another implication concerns which party ahould undertake
specific investments when that is something they can chose. In our framework, achiev-
ing efficiency requires lesa from a long term contract if all apeci5c investments aze
made by one party. This has implications for whether the coal mine or the public
utility invests in the railway that linka he two. A final implication of our results
concerns, in the spirit of Shavell (1980, 1984) and Rogerson (1984), the design of
provisions for breach of contract. We discuss thia in detail later.
For the case of one pazty inveatments, Hazt and Moore (1988a) also ehow that4
efficient levels of investment can be achieved with incomplete contracta. In their
model, however, the scope for bargaining over the quasi-rents is limited by their
asaumption that trade is valuable only if it takea place at a pazticulaz date. Any delay
destroys all the potential gains from trade. Delay is therefore a credible threat only for
a party that would be worae off trading under the original contract than not trading at
all and then that party has all the bargaining power. If neither losea from trade under
the original contract, there is no renegotiatioa. There is thua not the same kind of
eharing of the ex post gains from trade that occura in, for example, a standard Rubin-
stein (1982) bazgaining model in which each party can impoae a cost on the other by
delaying agreement without in the process completely deatroying the potential gains
from an agreement in the future. This assumption of Hart and Moore (1988a) is appro-
priate for certain economic contexts but it does not fit many of the examples that have
been of concern in the literature. In particulaz, in employer~mployee relationships and
long term supply relationshipa delay doea not typically destroy all the potential gains
from trade. Moreover, unlike Hart and Moore, our result for this case is not limited to
specific inveatment of the type we have called "self investment". It therefore covera a
wider class of economically important situations.~
The second case we study ia motivated by Joskow's (1988) observationa con-
cerning long term contracts for coal. Joskow found that in many casea contracts had
long duration but, over their lifetime, the trading price was adjuated to reflect outside
events (in particular observable changea in variables affecting costs), with the result
that the price at which trade actually occurred did not get too far out of line with spot
market prices. In the case in which both parties make apecific investments of the aelf
investment type, we show the following reault. If the obaervable variables enable a
long term contract to ensure that whenever it is efficient for trade to occur the price is
not renegotiated, then the investmenta will be at the efficient level even though those
30ther recent papers that extend results in Hart and Moore (1988a) are Aghion,
Dewatripont and Rey (1989) and Emons (1989). Neither study trading relationships
that are potentially long term, rather than once~ff.5
levels do not themselves form part of the contract.
The essence of our argument is quite intuitive. It has to do with the way
opportuníties outside the relationship affect bargaining within it. We therefore devote
the next section of the paper to a discussion of bazgaining in continuing relationships
with outside options. The remainder of the paper develops these ideas more formally.
II. Bargaining in Continuing Relationships and Ontaide Optiona
Consider a buyer and a seller for some product who can each period deáde either
to trade or not to trade one unit of the good. The value of trade to the buyer and~or
the seller can be increased by investment in a specific asset. Suppose it is the seller
who makes this investment. The essence of the azgument for the seller's choice of in-
vestment being ineffiáent is as follows. Once she has made an investment, the value of
trade is increased. Even if there is a long term contract that fixes the trading price, a
buyer who can credibly refuse to trade can use that to bargain for a renegotiation of the
contract and thus a share of that increase in value. Shavell (1984), Rogerson (1984),
Williamson (1985), and Green and Laffont (1989) assume he will get some of it. If he
dces, the seller dces not get all the returns from the investment and her choice of
investment will not in general be effiáent.
When trade is a one~ff event and bargaining over the gains from trade is a stan-
dard alternating offers Rubinstein (1982) bargaining game, any increase in the gains
results in the buyer getting some of that increase. There aze, however, two reasons
why that need not be true in more general models. First, if trade is a continuing pro-
Ce88 and if the buyer and the seller have agreed to a contract before the inveatment is
made, it dces not necessarily follow that a refusal to renegotiate by the seller will result
in the buyer actually refusing to trade under the original contract. The contract may
make it in his interest to trade at least for the period until the next offer is made. But
antiápation of that will affect the seller's deásion about whether to agree to renego-
tiation. If she knows the buyer will trade anyway under the original contract, she will
refuse to renegotiate knowing that trade will still take place. That can go on for ever.s
That in itself may not be enough to prevent the buyer getting some of the returns
from the specific investment. Events can happen that make it unprofitable for the
buyer to trade under the original contract. That is where the second reason comes in.
At the trading atage, aíter the apecific investment has been made, there are in fact 3
trading posaibilities the buyer and the seller can contemplate at each point in time.
Each can decide to trade at the contract price ií the other will (we call this the T
option), not to trade for the moment at the contract price (the N option), and to break
off the relationship in such a way that the value oí the specific inveatment is destroyed
(the O, or outside, option). The crucial analytical difference between the N and the O
optiona ia that the N option retains the possibility of benefiting from the specific invest-
ment by trading in the future while the O option does not.
Some examples may make the practical difference clear. Suppose the speá5c
investment is the transactions cost involved in an employee moving to a location near
his workplace. The N option corresponds to reíusing to work for the employer but
staying in the same house (and possibly getting a,job with another employer in the
locality). The O option corresponds to taking a job in a different locality and moving
house. If the O option is taken, the value of the epecific investment is zero from then
on. For the aeller of an intermediate good, the N option corresponds to not trading this
period or to selling this period's output on the spot mazket. The 0 option corresponds
to making a long term contract to supply the output to another buyer. Again, if the O
option is taken, the value of the specific investment becomea zero.
This distinction is important analytically because the values of the N and the O
options affect the bargaining outcome in different ways. We know from Shaked and
Sutton (1984) and Sutton (1986) that, in a standazd Rubinstein bazgaining model with
alternating offers, the value of the N option acts as a status quo point. The payoff each
agent would get from the game if no O option were available would be hia or her statua
quo value plus some shaze of the additional gains from the relationahip. So, if no O
option were available, any increase in the gains from the relationahip over and above
the status quo values that results from additional apecific investments will be shazed7
between the agents. However, the value of the O option (at least in the form it takes
in the present paper) affects an agent's payoff from the relationship only if it is greater
than the value he or she would get in the absence oí that option. It acts simply as a
constraint on how low an agent's payoff can he. Thua, if one agent's payeff is eqna.l to
the value of the O option, the increase in the gaina from the relationahip that results
from additional specific investment will, at the margin, all go to the other agent.
Since this ia fundamental to our results it is worth emphasizing the rationale for
it. Suppose the seller makes an offer to the buyer that is worth more than the buyer's
O option. When deciding whether or not to accept that offer, the buyer will certainly
not refuse and choose his 0 option instead because doing so would ensure that he could
never get more than the value of his O option. Thus the seller never needa to take
seriously the threat that the buyer will choose his O option rather than accept an ofíer
that gives a higher payoff. It is not credible. That threat cannot, therefore, be used to
lever more of the quasi-rent out of the seller. In contrast, the threat that the buyer will
use the N option can be credible as a means of getting more than the value of the N
option because it always leaves open the posaibility of reaching agreement to ahare the
gains from the relationship at a later date.
The model in the present paper does not generate a atandard Rubinstein bargain-
ing game because trade can be a continuing process, not just a once-for-all aharing of a
pie. But exactly the same principlea apply to outside options. From this, it is atraight-
forwazd to see how the existence of an O option enablea the choice of speáfic iavest-
ment to be ef5cient in the case in which only one party makes an investment. Suppoae
the seller makea the investment. All the buyer and the seller need to do is to agree a
long term contract that ensures that the buyer does better from the O option than from
the other options. That can be achieved by a breach payment from the seller to the
buyer that is sufficiently lazge relative to the paymenta under the other options. (It ie
only the relative sizes of the paymenta that matter for this purpose.) Then, when it is
efficient that no trade take place, the buyer will take hia outside option. When it ia ef-
ficient that trade take place, the seller and the buyer will renegotiate the trading price8
with the buyer receiving the valae of his O option. But the value oï the O option is, by
definition of that option, independent of the level of the apeáfic investment. Thus any
increase in the gaina from the relationship that reaults from the seller investing will go
entirely to the seller. That will generate the effiáent level of investment.
It is clear that a symmetric azgument works if it is the buyer who makea the
specific investment instead of the seller. It should also be noted that the azgument
works even if the seller's investment benefits the buyer directly, that is, it is not solely
what we have called a"self investment". It is the buyer's total payoff that is given by
the outaide option. Thus, the more the buyer benefits directly from the seller's invest-
ment, the lower will be the trading price negotiated, leaving the buyer's payoif
unchanged.
A related argument explains what is required for a long term contract to achieve
efficient investments in the case in which both parties make investments oï the self
investment type. To induce effiáent investments, we need each party to get all the
returna írom his or her own investment. With aelf investmenta, that will be the case
provided the price at which trade actually takea place is independent of the level of the
investments. If it were never efficient to aepazate then, in view of the argument above,
a fixed price with breach only by mutual conaent would ensure this. But, for reasons
discusaed in Rogerson (1984), auch a contract will induce ineffiáent inveatment if it is
ever efficient to sepazate. If, oa the other hand, either party can sepazate unilaterally
then, at a fixed price, there will be árcumstances (a very high or very low price on the
outside market, for example) in which one party would prefer to exercise the O option
rather than continue the existing contract. Suppose a high outaide mazket price makes
the aeller prefer the O option to the current contract. It may still be efficient that the
relationship continue - if, for example, the buyer would still buy at the outside market
price. Then the contract will be renegotiated with the seller receiving the value of her
0 option. But the value of that option is independent of the seller's specific invest-
ment. Thus renegotiation will result in the buyer getting the return from the seller's
investment. Anticipation of thia will also iaduce ineffiáent investment.9
What a long term contract must do to prevent thia ia to ensure that, in all contin-
gencies in which it is efficient that the relationship continue, the trading price is auch
that neither party prefers the O option. If the price can be made contingent on enough
relevant variables to ensure this, then the levels of investment choaen by the partiea
will be efficient. Note that the contingent price has nothing to do with risk aversion.
It acts simply to keep the parties' payotfs within the bounda of their O optiona. That
ia a possible interpretation of the coal contracts analyzed by Joakow (1988).
The remainder of this paper demonatratea theae reaults formally. Sectioa III aeta
out the model. Sections IV and V analyze the bargaining game played after the
specific investmenta have been made. Section VI establishes the effiáency result for
one sided specific investmenta. Section VII does this for the case of two sided aelf
investmenta. Section VIII diacusaea some further implications of our resulta.
III. The Model
A buyer b and a seller s negotiate a contract for the long term supply of a good at
the rate of either one unit or no unita at each date. This is Stage I. We wiA speáfy
precisely what aspects of a contract are enforceable when we deal with each of the
different cases we consider. Roughly, the enforceable aspecta will be a price for the
good if trade occurs and penalties for breach of contract. The level of relationship
speáfic investments made by either the buyer or the seller is, however, never part of
the legally enforceable contract. As discussed in Hart and Holmstróm (1987), thia can
be because of the high cost of verifying the levels of these investmenta in court, or
becauae of the complezity involved in apeáfying what these investments should be. We
asaume that there ie no third party to act as a reaidual claimant.4
At Stage II, once the contract is sigaed, each agent chooaes apeáfic investments.
There are potentially four typea of apeáfic investmenta. The buyer can make an
sGiven the way agents renegotiate in our model, the ez post agreement will always be
ex post ef5cient. Thus, even if the contract required payments to a third part , the
agents would ez post always agree to resánd them. See Eawaran and Kotwal ~1984)
for more on this.10
investment that increasea his own payoff at a given trading price. He can also make an
investment that increases the seller's payoff at a given trading price. These will be
denoted Ibb and Ibs respectively. Similazly, the seller can make an investment that
increases her own payoff, and an investment that increases the buyer's payoff, at a
given contract price. These aze denoted Iss and Isb respectively. All investments aze
choaen from the interval [0, I], where I is a positive constant. For notational
convenience, let Ib -{Ibb' Isb} and Is - {I~, IeS}, and denote the complete vector of
investmenta by I-{Ib, Is} E T-[0, I]4.
For examplea of these different types of investmenta, coasider a labour contract in
which the buyer is the employer and the seller is an employee. The investment Iss
corresponds to a specific investment by the employee that raises her utility in the job.
This might be the transactions costs in moving house close to the workplace or in
making friends among co-workers. Leaving the job reduces the value of these. The
investment Ibs might be that part of moving costs reimbursed by the employer or a
subsidy for buying a new house. These are expenditnrea that do not directly affect the
productivity of the worker in the firm. The inveatment Ibb corresponds to the cost of
specific training incurred by the firm. Finally, Iab corresponds to speàfic training costs
incurred by the employee or efforts made by the employee to come up with ways of
improving productivity in the job. Other examples arise in the case of supply of inter-
mediate gooda.
It is not hazd to see why it may be difficult to write an enforceable contract con-
tingent on the level of many of these inveatments. Monitoring the effort put into
forming friends, findíng a suitable house, or coming up with suggestions for improving
productivity has obvious difficulties. So doea verifying the value to the firm of any
such improvements. It is with investmenta for which enforceable contingent contracts
aze not made that the problem of inducing effiàent levels of investment is aerious. We
therefore assume that contract clauses contingent on the levels of any of these apecific
investments are not enforceable.
The choice of the level of investments is followed (at Stage III) by a realization of11
a etate of nature that determines both the value of the relationship to the two pazties,
and the value of their alternative opportunities. The state is given by a-(B, v, p) E
[B, 8Jx L, a' K[~, {~] - E. The pazameter B represents shocks to the valne of continning
the relationship; while v and p aze the values (measured in flows per unit of time) of
the outside options of the buyer and seller respectively. At this atage both the state of
nature and the investment levels become common knowledge to the two agents. A
complete description of the etate of the relationship at the end of Stage III is thus given
by~-(I,a)Eft-7YE.
Assnmption 1: ~ fl~ 0 and the distribntion of a is s measnre 7t(.) oa E that is
independent of I.
Once the agents have observed the state of the world and the level of relationship
specific investments, trade may begin. At this stage (Stage IV), the agents may if they
wish renegotiate the terms of the contract signed at Stage I. We treat trade as a flow
in continuous time and, for conveaience, label the start of Stage IV as t- 0. In con-
trast to Hart and Moore (1988a), we suppose that renegotiation can occur at any time
while trade is (or is not) taking place until such time as one of the agents decides to
terminate the relationshíp permanently by taking up an outside option. During nego-
tiations, agents can decide to supply the good or not under the terms of any previously
agreed contract, or to break off the relationship by choosing an outside option. Thus,
the contract signed at Stage I acts as a default contract until a new contract is agreed.
In principle, the new contract can also be renegotiated and acts as a default nntil a
further contractis agreed.
The sequence of events is illustrated in Figure 1.
I II III IV infinite horizon
Cóntract tnvestments State m Start of renegotiation game
signed chosen revealed (t - 0)
FIGOYE 1: EáCHANGE GA)[E12
The money value of the utility of the good to the buyer at any date at which
trade takes place is denoted v(Ib, ~, the money cost to the seller of supplying the good
u(Is, ~.
Assnmption 2: For all m E(1, there eriat positive ~nstants k~ 1~ 0 ench that
v(Ib, ~ E[l, k] and n(Is, B) E [- k, - 1]. Fnrthermore, for each B E A, v(Ib, ~ and
n(Is, ~ are differentiable ia lb and Ie.
The requirement that v(Ib, ~ is atrictly positive and u(Is, ~ strictly negative
ensures that, at a zero price, the buyer would always prefer trade to no trade and the
seller would always prefer no trade to trade. That is, the buyer gets utility from the
good and the seller incurs a cost in supplying it. For notational convenience we some-
times write these money values as v(~) and u(m) (that is, as functions of the state ~)
without however implying that Is, v and ~ affect v(-) or Ib, v and p affect u(.).
Assumption 2 also ensures that the gains from trade are bounded.
Since the state ~ ia common knowledge when the renegotiation game is played,
the outcome of the complete ezchange game will in general be a function of this state.
An outcome of the renegotiation pa,rt of the game can be represented in the following
way. Let t~(~) denote the time at which the outside option is taken by agent i for state
m, (t'(~) could be infinite), p(t, m) the payment made by the buyer to the seller at time
t, and -r(t, ~) E{0, 1} be 1 if trade takes place at time t and 0 if it does not. Then z(w)
-{p(-, m), r-(-, w), tb(m), ts(~)} defines an ontcome of the renegotiation game given
state m E n. Let t'(m) - min {tb(~), ts(m)}. Then the ex post payoffs to the buyer
and seller respectively fiom playing the renegotiation game are
(3.1a) v[~, E(~)] - ft~(~)[~{t, ~)~(Ib, ~- P(t, ~)le rtdt
f {e rtb(~)v-e rt~(~)p[t'(~), ~]}~r13
(3.1b) U[~, z(m)] - ft~(~)[r{t, r~)u(Is, B) f P(t, ~))e~dt
-~ {e rts(~)P t e~~(~)P~t'(~), ~~}~r~
where r is the common discount rate of the two pazties. We assume the agents are risk
neutral. To calculate the ex ante payoffs at the time the investments aze made for any
given ex post outcome function z(.), we take the expected value of the ex post payoffs
over all states and deduct the costs of the investments. These ex ante payoffs are
(3.2a) V[I, z(.)] -- Ibb - Ibs t f V(v~ z(~)) dX(v)
oEE
(3.2b) U[I, z( -)] -- Isb - Iss t f U~v~ z(~)~ dX(~).
oEE
Since utility is transferable in this model, the total ex post Surplu8 from the
renegotiation part of the game is well defined and given by
(3.3) S(~) - max {v(Ib, ~ t u(Is, ~, vf~}.
The maximum ex ante surplus at the beginning of the relationship from choosing ef-
fiàent levels of investments is given by
(3.4) S~` - max f [S(m)~r]dX(o) - ~Iij .
IET oEE i,jE b,s}
Obviously we aze concerned only with the case S~ ~ E{vt~}~r as otherwise apeàfic
investment is unnecessazy for effiàency. We denote by I~` effiàent levels of investment
that solve (3.4). We assume that these investment levels aze all either zero or in the
interior oí T.
IV. The Renegotiation Game
To determine the outcome function z(-) for the renegotiation game, we need to
specify in detail the rules of that game. We assume it is an infinite horizon bargaining
game with the first offer made at t- 0 and subsequent offers following at time inter-
vals of 0. We keep the game as symmetric as possible while allowing for potentially14
different bargaining strengths. At time n~, where n is zero or an even integer and
Pn-1 is the contract in force at the atart of period n, the following aequence of moves
occurs if the relationahip has not previously been terminated.
(n.0) Either the buyer or the seller is given the opportunity to offer a new
contract, with probabilities ~r and l~r respectively, where a E(0, 1).
(n.l) The agent chosen in step n.0 offers a new contract, denoted Pn.
(n.2) The responding agent chooses the action yn E{A, R, AO, RO}, where the
action A is accept the new oontract and continue the game, the action R is
reject the new contract and continue the game, the action AO is accept the
new contract but terminate the game by chooeing an outside option, and the
action RO is reject the new contract and terminate the game by choosing an
outaide option. If A or AO is chosen, Pn - Pn. If R or RO is chosen, Pn -
Pn-1' Chooaing the outside option is an irreversible decision to terminate
the relationship under the conditions of the contract Pn and receive payoff
at rate ~(for the seller) or v(for the buyer) thereafter.
(n.3) If A or R was chosen in step n.2, the buyer chooses his trading action xn E X
-{T, N}, where T is an offer to trade, and N a refusal to trade, under the
terms of the contract Pn.
(n.4) If A or R was chosen in step n.2, the seller choosea her trading action xn E
X.
If A or R is chosen in step n.2 and both players choose T, trade occurs until (n~-1)~.
If one player chooses N, then no trade occurs until (n-~l)~. In both cases, the game
proceeds at (n-~1)0 with the above sequence of moves repeated.
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FIGOYE 2: YODHD n OF YENEGOTIATION GA1E
There are two ways in which the game is not completely symmetric. First, the
probability oí the buyer and of the seller having the opportunity to offer a new contract
need not be the same. Differences in this provide a convenient way to parameteriae the
relative bargaining strength of the two agents. Second,in choosing trading atrategies,
the buyer moves first. In fact, for generic games, thia second asymmetry has no effect
on the set of equilibria.
Note that at each stage only the agent accepting or rejectíng the offer of a new
contract has the opportunity to terminate Lhe game by taking up an outside option. As
Shaked (1988) has ahown, the timing of such opportunities is important. The preaent
game corresponda to what Shaked (1988) calla a"bazaaz", in which the move that
precedes one pazty having the opportunity to take np an outside option allows the
other to make a new offer. That ae~ems to us the appropriate way to model the kind of
long term relationship discussed here.16
The important distinction between the N option and the NO option is that the
latter destroys the value of the apecific investments for ever after. The N option
merely reaults in their yielding no return for a period of length ~, but leaves open the
possibility of returns from them after that. There is a similaz distinction between the
A and the AO options. Note also that a renegotiated contract can in principle be
renegotiated again so that steps 0 to 4 aré repeated for ever unless a player chooses to
terminate the game.
A contract specifies the payments that must be made by the buyer to the seller
for each verifiable event that occurs while it is in force. In the spirit of the incomplete
contracts literature discussed in the Introduction, we assume that the verifiable events
are whether or not trade occurs and whether or not the relationship has been termin-
ated but, in the latter case, not which party decides to terminate it and in the former,
not which party refused to trade if no trade occurred. A contract can thus be denoted
by a vector P-{p'}, for i E{T, N, O} E Ot3, where pT is the payment made if trade
occurs, p0 the payment made if the relationship is terminated, and pN the payment
made if no trade occurs but the relationship is not terminated. We pla.ce no restric-
tions on the signs or magnitudes of these. In the case of a renegotiated contract, the
atate m is common knowledge to the buyer and seller at the time the contract is agreed
so there is no need for the contract provisions to depend explicitly on the state. In the
case of a contract agreed at Stage I, the paymenta specified cannot be contingent on the
level of specific investments, nor on B, nor on whether a party accepts or rejects any
contract offered subsequently (the A and R choices made in step 2 above). In one of
the casea we deal with below the payments can be conditional on the values of the
outside options v and ~c but, since this will be cleaz from the context, we do not make
that ezplicit in the notation.
Our firat result eatabliahes that, for any contract in force at t- 0, there exist
unique Markov perfect equilibrium payoffs to the buyer and the seller in the renego-
tiation game (Stage IV) and characterizes those payoffs for the case in which the bar-
gaining frictions become negligible in the senae that the time 0 between successive17
offers gces to zero. The essence of a Markov perfect equilibrium is that strategies aze
conditioned only on payoff relevant information, see Maskin and Tirole ( 1988). In the
present game, the payoff relevant information is the contract currently in force at each
stage of the game. This is captured in the following tormal definition.
Definition: A Mazkov perfect eqnilibrinm of the renegotiation game is a sabgame
perfett eqnilibrinm with the pmperty that the eqnilibrinm payaffs at the beginning of
period n depead only on n and on the contract Pn-1 in force at the start of period n.
Note that this definition does not imply that a Markov perfect equilibrium is
stationary, only that past actions affect the equilibrium through the contract agreed.b
Proposition 1: For any contract P-{pT~ pN~ p0} in force at t- 0, there erist
(generically) nniqne Markov perfett eqmlibriam payoffa to the bnyer and the eellec in
the renegotiation game. The limiting payofi to the bnyer as A~ 0, V~(m, P), ia as
follows.
Case (i): v(m)~-n(~) ~ W-p and either v(m}-pT (- pN or n(v,)fpT c pN.
rS(rr)~g, if rS(~)-pg ~ v-p~ and (1-r)S(~)tpg ~~tpg,
(4.1) rV'(rr, P) - v-pfi, if rS(~)-pg c v-p~;
S(~)~~~~ if ( 1-Jr)S(~).p" ~ ~fpo.
Case (ii): v(m)fn(m) ~ v.}p and both v(W}-pT 1-pN and n(~r)fpT ) pN.
6It is worth emphasizing that, if the renegotiation game ís taken to be a finite horizon
~rather than an infinite horizon) game, Proposition 1 remains true when the term
' subgame perfect equilíbrium" is substituted for "Mazkov perfect equilibrium". In
many respects, a finite horizon is the natural way to model the type of relationship
studied here. For that case, however, the proofs are much more complicated, which is
why we have restricted the present discussion to the ia5nite horizon case. Even for
this case, the unique Markov perfect equilibrium is efficient and any distribution of the
ex post aurplus can be attained as a Markov perfect equilibrium by appropriate choice
of contract. Thus the players lose nothing by restricting themaelves to Markov
strategies. In effect, the Mazkov property simply ensurea that there can never be any
ambiguity about which subgame perfect equilibrium will be played once the contract
has been agreed.ls
v(~)~T, if v(~)-~T ) v-p0 and n(~)}pT ?!~'p~i
(4.2) rV~(~, P) - v-p~, if v(~)-pT t v-p~;
S(~)y~-P~, if n(~)tpT ~ ~tp0.
Caee (~)- ~~)fu(~) ~ ~!~
(4-3) ~(~~ P) - (v-P~)~r-
In each case, the payoff to the aeller, U'(~, P), is
(4.4) U'(~, P) - S(~)~r - V~(~, P).
The proof of this proposition is given in the appendix. To understand the nature
of the proposition and ita relation to the existing literature on equilibrium in bargain-
ing gamea, it is instructive to stazt by considering case (i). In that case, trade is effic-
ient because v(r~)fu(r~) ~ v-~~ but, because either v(~)-pT G-pN or u(~)fpT G pN
one party loses by trading under the contract P and so trade will not take place unless
that contract ia renegotiated. Thua a refusal to trade acts as a credible threat point in
bazgaining over the renegotiation and in that bargaining each party receivea a payoff
equal to the value of the threat point (-pN to the buyer, pN to the seller) plus a shaze
of the surplus S(m) that depends on their relative bargaining powers a and 1-a, prov-
ided thia payoff exceeds the value of his or her outside option after allowing for the
payment p~. This is the equilibrium outcome given by (4.4) and the top line of (4.1).
If theae payoffs give one pazty less than the value of his or her outside option then,
becauae trade is ef5cient, the contract is renegotiated to give that party an equilibrium
payoff equal to the value oí his or her outside option and the other party receives the
reat of the surplus. These are the outcomea given by (4.4) and the two lower lines of
(4.1). Thus, ae in Sutton (1986), the outaide options act only as constraints on the set
of feasible allocations, not as a status quo in the Nash bazgaining sense. Next consider
case (iii). With v(ra)fu(m) c vfp, trade is no longer better than no trade, so the
pazties break up the match with each receiving the value of his or her outside option
after allowing for the payment p~.19
So faz, the equilibrium payoffs have a form similar to thoae in a bargaining game
concerning a once-off division of a pie. The important difference that reaults from
trade being a continuing procesa is case (ii). In case (ii), trade ia ef5cient and it is in
the interests of both parties te trade evea if the contract P is not renegotiated. This
makes a refusal to trade by one party no longer a credible threat because,if the other
calla his or her bluff, the first pazty would do better to choose trade rather than no
trade. Thus, unless one pazty or the other doea better by choosing the outside option,
neither will auccumb to a threat by the other not to trade and the payoffs under the
contract P will not be renegotiated. This is the equilibrium outcome given by (4.4)
and the top line of (4.2). The lower two linea of (4.2) give the equilibrium payoffs for
the cases in which one or the other outside option is binding. Again as in Sutton
(1986),these options act only as constrainta on the set of feasible allocationa, not as a
atatus quo in the Nash bargaining sense. By including case (ii), therefore, Proposition
1 extends the standard resulta for equilibrium in bazgaining games to the aituation ia
which trade ia potentially a continuing (not just a once~ff) process and there akeady
e~sts a contract under which, in the absence of renegotiation, trade can take place.
The "generic" qualification to the uniquenesa of the equilibrium payoffs in Prop-
osition 1 applies to the situation that falls between case (i) and case (ii). If v(m~pT -
-pN and u(~)fpT 1 pN, the buyer is indifferent between trading and not trading
under the contract P, while the aeller strictly prefers trade. In this case both "trade"
and "no trade" aze equilibrium outcomes and they generate different equilibrinm
payoffs. The same applies to the case v(m}-pT ~ pN and u(~)fpT - pN. However,
the cases v(~)-pT --pN and u(~)-~pT - pN are non-generic and agenta can always
select the contract P in auch a way that this situation occura with probability zero.
For concreteness, we asaume that, when one agent is iadifferent, no trade occura. In
what follows we restrict attention to the limiting game as ~~ 0 for which an ezplicit
solution ia given in Propoaition 1. Essentially the same results as in Sections VI and
VII below apply to the non-limiting games but the proofs are mnch more mesay.20
V. Eqmlibrinm With No Coatract Ez Ante
In thia aection we consider what happens if the buyer and the aeller do not make a
long term contract at Stage I before they decide on the levels of the apecific invest-
ments. Without an ex ante contract no paymeats are required in Stage IV unless the
pazties agree to a new contract. Having no ez ante contract is, therefore, equivalent to
having a contract, denoted by PO E R3, that specifiea p~ - 0 for i E {T, N, O}. Then,
since u(-) ~ 0, both agenta muat agree to a new contract at the beginning of stage IV
specifying a atrictly positive price for the good before the seller will agree to trade, so
case (ii) of Proposition 1 never occurs. The following result then follows directly from
Proposition 1.
Proposition 2: Consider the following 4 case8:
Case 1: v(r.~)fn(r~) ~ v f p;
Case 2: v(~)tn(~) ~ v f P and xS(~) E (v, S(ra~P);
Case 3: v(m)fn(m) ~ v f P and xS(m) ( v,
Case 4: v(m)tn(~) ~ v i- P and nS(~) ~ S(m~p.
If no contract is agreed between the bnyer and the edler at Stage I, their respective
eqnilibrinm payoffs, V~(m, PO) and U'(~, P~), from the limiting reaegotiation game
are given by
v, in cases 1 and 3,
(5.1) rV~(~, PO) - xS ( m) , in case 2,
S(m) - p, in case 4,
(s.2) rU~(m, P~) - s(m) - rv~(t~, PO).
Note that case 1 occurs when separation is efficient. Case 2 occurs when trade is
efficient and the outside options are not binding. Cases 3 and 4 occur when the outside
options for the buyer and for the seller, respectively, are binding.
It is straightforwazd to see from Proposition 2 that, in the absence of an ex ante
contract, the specific investments chosen will not in general be ef5cient. If, forzl
example, case 2 occurs with probability 1, the buyer and the aeller simply ahare the
snrplus generated by the investments in proportions ~r and (1-x) and we know from
Holmstrom (1982) that such a sharing rule is not efficient. For the preaent model, it
follows immediately from (3.31 that effic~ent levels of inveatment mnat satisfy
8[S(m)~r]~BIij - 1 for all i, j E{b, s}. But it is also immediate from (5.1) that, when
case 2 occurs with probability 1, the buyer will choose his inveatment so that his
marginal benefit 8[~rS(~)~r]~BIbb - 1, which ia inefficient. Similarly, the seller will
choose her investment so that 8((1-~r)S(~)~r]~BIss - 1, which is also inefficient. Since
in no case does the investor's private return from inveatment exceed the social return,
this inefficiency will persist whenever case 2 occurs with positive probability.
There are two other casea in which it is straightforward to see that the levels of
investment will be inefficient in the absence of an ex ante contract. Whenever caee 3
occurs, the buyer gets no return on any investment he makea. Thus, if it ia efficient
that he should inveat and if case 3 occurs with positive probability, he will invest too
little. Similarly, whenever case 4 occurs, the seller gets no return on any iavestment
ahe makes. Thus, if it is efficient that ahe should invest and if case 4 occurs with
positive probability, she will invest too little.
These remarks apply to the case in which there is no long term contract agreed ex
ante between the buyer and the seller. The remaining sections of this paper examine
the way in which long term contracts can overcome some of the inefficiencies.
VI. Eífic~ent One Party Inveatment
In this section we ahow that, in the case in which one party makea all the re-
lationahip specific investments, the exiatence of an outaide option ensurea that the level
oí those investmenta will be ef5cient. This ia the case that has received most attention
in the literature. The papers by Shavell (1980, 1984) and Rogerson (1984) study the
relative efficiency of difíerent types of damage measures for breach of contract for thia
caee. Both Rogerson (1984) and Shavell (1984) explicitly conaider the poasibility of
renegotiation. Although they 5nd that the type of damage measure affects efficiency,22
they are unable to find any measure that reaults in the first best.
The easential point is that the existence of an outside option allows the construc-
tion of a contract that gives the investing party all the returna to the investments. We
analyze the case in which the buyer makes the investmenta. The case in which the
seller makes the inveatments ia entirely symmetric.
Asanmption 3: The efficient investment levela satisfy 88 - gb - 0.
In Hart and Moore (1988a) and the other literature cited above, it is assumed
that all specific investments are of the "self investment" type, which is equivalent to
assuming Ibs is also zero. That is not, however, necessary for efficiency.
Propoaition 3: Let Assumption 3 be satiafied and let V' and U' be any pair of
nnmbers satiafying V' t U~ - S', where S; is the efficient ez ante snrplns defined in
(3.4). Then there eriats a contract P which, agreed npon at Stage I, reanlta in nniqne
eqnilibrinm payoffs in the ezchange game oí Vs to the bnyer and Ut to the seller.
Pzoof: Define the contract P-{pT pN~ p0} by
E{~c} f pD - rU',
u(~) f PT c L~ t PD~
(1-~r)S(r,~) -F PN G ~ f pD.
Then from Proposition 1, whichever case applies,
(6.2) V'(~~ P) - [S(~) - h - PDIIr.
For cases (i) and (ii) of Propoaition 1, this is immediate. For case (iii), it followa from
the fact that S(m) - vfp for this case. Thus the buyer's ex ante payoff V[I, z(.)] -
E{S(w)~r} - U' - Ibb - Ibs' It then follows from Assumption 3 and the definition of S'
in (3.4) that investment levels that maximize the buyer's ex ante payoff generate total
ex ante aurplus S~` and thus that the buyer's unique ex ante payoff is S`-U~ - V'. ~
Efficiency ia poasible in this case becauae of the existence of an outside option for
the seller. The long term contract used in the proof ensures that the seller's outside23
option is binding in all states of the world. The seller'a payoff is thus alwaya equal to
the value of her outside option. Since the valne of that outsíde option is independent of
the level of inveatments undertaken by the buyer, the seller is unable to bazgain away
any of the returns on those investments Thus the buyer gets all the returns a.nd there-
fore invests efficiently. If the seller does all the inveatment instead of the buyer, a
precisely symmetric argument worka.
The contract used in the proof is actually rather simple, deapite the large number
of contingencies that would be required for a contract to be complete in the technical
senae. In effect, it requires only three levels of payment to be apecified, one if trade
between the parties takea place, a different payment if either the buyer or the seller
commits to trading with an outside pazty instead, and a third if neither of those occurs.
Moreover, since only the relative aizea of these paymenta matter for incentive purposea,
the contract can always be designed ao that they aze all positive or all negative, with
an appropriate aide payment at Stage I to achieved any desired diatribution of gaina.
Thus the contract can always enaure that payments for breach are to be made by
whichever party courts can most easily force to pay.
That contract is very different in design from those implicit in the discussion of
legal remedies for breach of contract. The standard legal remedies of ezpectation
damages, reliance damagea, restitution damagee and specific performance, are intended
to compensate the pazty who makes apecific investmenta (reliance expenditurea, in the
legal terminology) when the other agent refuaea to trade on the terma originally agreed.s
The contract uaed here is deaigned, in contrast, to ensure that the noninvesting party
would never loae by refusing to trade on the terms originally agreed. By doing that, it
ensures that the noninvesting pazty cannot capture any of the returns to
eBriefly, the different damage measures are as followa. Ezpectation damagea make the
defaulting party pay an amount that puts the other party in the poaition he would have
been in had the contract been performed. Reliance damagea require the defaulting
pazty to compensate the other party for hia relation apecific investmenta (reliance
expenditures) and to return all previous payments. Restitution damages require the
defaulting party to return only the payments that have been made between the
contracting parties. Spetific performance requirea the transaction to be carried out on
the original terms if at least one party wishes.24
the investment.
The original contract is, of course, never intended to be actually carried out. It
will always be renegotiated to ensure that trade takes place if that is efficient. Indeed,
the trading price will always be renegotiated upwazds if it is the buyer who makes the
investments. Despite the fact that this may look like the seller exploiting the buyer's
irrevocable investment in the relationship, it is actually a central part of inducing the
buyer to choose the efficient level of investment. Our model therefore provides cases in
addition to the ones discussed by Huberman and Kahn (1988) in which actual, not just
potential, renegotiation plays a non-trivial role in improving resource allocation.
There are in fact some cases in whích efficient investment can be achieved even in
the absence of a long term contract.
Proposition 4: Let Assnmption 3 be satisfied and let V' and U~ be any pair of
nnmbers satisfying Vt f U~ - S~`, where S~ is the e~icient e: ante surplns de6ned in
(3.4). Then, if cases 2 and 3 in Proposition 2 occnr with probabálity zero for all poss-
ible investments, the ez ante payoffs of V' and U~ for the bnyer and eeller respectively
can be attained as eqnilibrinm payoHs in the limiting ezchange game even if no long
term contract is possible.
Proof: If cases 2 and 3 of Proposition 2 never occur, then with no long term con-
tract U~(m, P~) - p.. Therefore the buyer always receives the full returns from any
investment. Since the renegotiation game always ensures ex post ef5ciency, the
investment chosen by the buyer will thus also be efficient. Moreover, V' and U~ can
be achieved by a single payment from the buyer to the seller at Stage I with value
equivalent to U~`-E{p}~r at date 0. ~
One situation in which cases 2 and 3 of Proposition 2 never occur is when ~r is
close to (though not necessarily equal to) 1 so that the buyer has almost all the bar-
gaining power in the renegotiation. Then, since }c ~ 0, case 4 of Proposition 2 applies
whenever v(m)fu(m) ~ v-F~t.
It is instructive to compare the impiications of Proposition 4 with Becker's (1975)25
discussion of firm specific inveatments in labour marketa. Suppoae the aeller is a
worker, the buyer a 5rm providing specific training, and p the wage in a competitive
labour market. With a competitive labour mazket the firm will never offer the worker
an ex ante pa,yoff greater than U`- E{p1~r in date 0 value. When cases 2 and 3 of
Proposition 2 occur with probability zero then, in the abaence of a contract, the worker
will get only a payoff of p~r, either by taking a job outaide the firm at wage ~c if sepaz-
ation is efficient or by negotiating a wage p with the firm if it ia not. Thus the 5rm
gets all the returns from the specific training and, by Proposition 4, investment in this
will be efficient. Thus, as noted by Becker (1975), if the 5rm makes the investment
and collects all the returns, the level of apecific training it chooses will be efficient.
Where this result differs from Becker (1975) ia over what happens when there is a
possibility of labour turnover. To reduce quita, Becker auggesta that the firm ahare
some of the relationship specific rents with the worker. This would result in a rising
wage~tenure profile. The studies by Altonp and Shakotko (1987) and Abraham and
Farber (1987) claim, however, that tenure per se does not affect the wage once one
corrects for worker chazacteristics and experience. That ia what Propoaition 4 impliea,
despite the preaence of apecific inveatments by the firm and endogenoua turnover.
VII. Efficiency with Se1f Inveatment by Both Parties
In some cases efficiency requires both pazties to make specific investmenta. Then
the existence of outside options is, in contrast to the previoua case, no longer a suf-
ficient conditíon for efficient investment. In thia aection we conaider the caae in which
each agent makes an investment that, for a given trading price, affect his or her own
payoff only, what we have called a"self inveatment". In the case of employment this
corresponds to the firm inveating in specific training for the employee at the same time
as the employee incurs transactions costa in moving to a home located close to the job.
Our resulta here aze motivated by Joskow's (1987, 1988, 1989) observationa con-
cerning long term contracts for coal. Joakow observed that about 70"!0 of the coal con-
tracta in his data involved long term agreements ranging in duration from one yeaz to26
fifty yeazs, the duration being related to the level of relationship specific assets. In
Joskow (1988), he studied the nature of the pricing agreement íor contracts with dur-
ation longer than four yeazs. He found that most contracts specified not a fixed price,
but a price adjusted over time according to changes in certain external circumstances
(in pazticular, the input prices, productivity and actual costs faced by the supplier)
that kept the actual price paid from deviating too far from the spot mazket price.
If the parties can diversify enough to be risk neutral, such escalator clauses aze
not necessazy for risk shazing purposes. Presumably they also increase the complexity
of writing and administering contracts. Moreover, fixed price contracts have desirable
incentive properties with specific self investments because they ensure each party gets
the returns from his or her own self investments when trade takes place at that price.
However, as Shavell (1980, 1984) and Rogerson (1984) have shown, fixed price con-
tracts run into problems if there are conditions under which it is efficient for the re-
lationship to end. A contract can allow for sepazation decisions to be made in either of
two ways. It can allow each pazty to decide unilaterally to sepazate or it can require
that they both agree before separation can occur. But both ways have adverse
incentive effects. If both parties must agree to a separation (a specific performance
requirement), separation will occur only if the gainer compensates the loser. But then
the loser gets a private return on his or her specific investment even when there is no
social return on it because the relationship ends. This corresponds to Rogerson's result
that specific performance induces over investment. On the other hand, if either party
can unilaterally decide to separate, there will in general be circumstances (a high value
of the outaide option v or ~) in which one party would do better from sepazation than
from continuing to trade at the 5xed price even when it is efficient for the relationship
to continue. Suppose it is the seller's outside option p that is high. The buyer and the
seller will of course renegotiate the contract so that the relationship continues but the
seller will receive only her outside option payoff p from the renegotiation. Thus the
buyer will capture some of the return on the seller's self investment. Anticipation of
thia ex ante will have an adverse incentive effect on the level of investment. To ensure27
efficient investment, the pazties need to desígn a contract auch that (i) neither has a
binding outside option except when it ia efficient that they should separate, and (ii)
neither can use the N option as a credible threat to renegotiate the trading price.
We show that; under appmpriate conditions; it is possible for them to do that if
the long term contract can be conditioned on v and ~ even when the investment levels
themselves, and the random variable B that determinea the returns to the investmenta,
are not contractible. This can, moreover, be done without the need for paymenta for
breach of contract. The last property could be important in practice. Joskow suggests
that large breach payments are difficult to enforce and, particularly in the case of
public utilities, the authority to make advance commitment to them questionable.
Suppose B can take on only two values, a"good" value Bg and a"bad" value Bb,
such that in the good state trade between the buyer and the seller is always efficient,
whereas in the bad etate it ia never efficient. The good state might be the normal state
of afíaira for the long term relationship, the bad state an unlikely event, such as war or
a major accident at one of their facilities affecting theár ability to cazry out the
contract. In the bad state the value of continuing the relationship is lower than that of
choosing the outside option (which might, for example, be bankruptcy for one of the
parties). This, along with the assumption that only self investment ia efficient, is cap-
tured in the following assumption.
Assnmption 4: The efficient investment levels eatisfy eb - I~ - 0 and Iss' Ibb
~ 0. Moreover, v(0, g) f n(0, Bg) ~ v f p, for all (v, p) E A(9g), and v(Is, B~ ~ n(Iy,
Bb) t v t ~, for all (v, ~) E A(Bb), where A(B) -{(v, p) ~(B, v, p) E enpp X}.
The next proposition is concerned with the case in which the ex ante contract can
be made conditional on (v, p). In the case of coal, v and p depend on, for example, the
spot market price for coal and the price of other factors of production, which may be
readily verifiable. The levels of the specific investments and the value of B, however,
remain non-contractible.
Propoaition 5: Let Assnmption 4 be satiafied and Iet V' and U' be an~ pair oí28
nnmbera satisfying V' t U~ - St, where S' is the efficient ez ante snrplna defined in
(3.4). Then there esista a contract P(v, p) which, agreed npon at Stage I, resnlta in
nniqne equílibrinm payoffs in the limiting ezchange game of V' to the bnyer and U~ to
the seller. Fnrthermore, if side paymenta are permit~ked at Stage I, thie contract does
not reqnire penalties for breach.
Proof. Define the contract P(v, ~c) -{pT (v, p), pN, p~} by pN- p~ - 0 and
pT(v, p) such that u(0, Bg).}pT(v, p) ~ p, and v(o, g)-pT(v, {~) ~ v. This is always
possible because of Assumption 4. Note that, in the good state, v(~)fu(~) 1 vf{c for
all feasible investment levels and, since v, ~ 1 0, case (ii) of Proposition 1 always
applies under the contract P(v, p). Moreover, P(v, p) is defined in such a way that the
outside options never bind in the good atate so the payoff to the buyer in that state is
given by the top line of (4.2). In the bad state, case (iii) of Proposition 1 applies and
the payoff to the buyer from the renegotiation game is at the rate v. The ex ante pay-
off to the buyer defined in (3.2a) will therefore be
V[I, z(.)] --Ibb t r1 f{t{m)[v(Ibb~ ~-pT (v~ l~)] f [1-~r(~)]v}dX(Q),
oEE
where r(~) is 1 if trade is efficient and 0 otherwise. It is a straightforward exercise to
check that the level of investment maximizing V[I, z(.)] is efficient. A symmetric
argument for the seller establishes that under P(v, p) there will be efficient investment
by both parties in equilibrium. To obtain the payofls V~ and U' one sets the side
payments appropriately at the time of signing the contract P(v, p) in Stage I. If up
íront payments are not permitted, then one need only modífy each element of P(v, p)
by the same fixed amount to make the ex ante payoffs V' and U~. ~
The intuition underlying this result is simply that in those atates in which it is
efficient for trade to occur, it is important that the trading price not depend on the
levels of the specific investments. On the other hand, when separation is efficient, one
of the pazties needs actually to take up an outside option. A long term contract is
necessary to ensure that the trading price is not influenced by the levels of the specific29
investments. If there were no contract in force, the payoffs in the renegotiation game
would be those given in Proposition 2. When, for example, case 4 of that propoeition
occurs, the outside option for the seller is binding, the seller receives only the payoff
p~r and consequently receives no return on her investment. Indeed, there is always an
inefficiency if the outside option is binding for either party in circumstances in which it
is efficient for trade to occur. Assumption 4 ensures that it is possible to set breach
conditions such that the outside option is binding if and only if separation is effícient.
What Proposition 5 highlights is the importance of designing a contract whose
conditions do not depend on the relation specific investments and which in equilibrium
is not renegotiated. Tying certain paymenta to easily obeervable exogenous factors can
help reduce the incentives that an agent has to breach a contract and renegotiate. In
contrast to the efScient contract in the previous case, where renegotiation was an im-
portant ingredient, here renegotiation never effectively occurs, even though the trading
price itself changes. The analyais in this section provides a way to interpret Joskow's
observations on long term contracts for coal.
VIII. Some Implications
We have shown that mazket contracting can, despite incompleteness, ensure ef-
ficient investment in relationship specific assets under much wider conditions than has
been previously suggested. Moreover, at least in certain cases, this can be done with
contracts that aze not so complicated for it to be implausible that they could be
written or enforced.
There are a number of implications of this. One is that, in the kind of circum-
stances we have discussed here, there should be no need for institutional structures to
replace mazkets to economize on transactions costs. Indeed, our analysis enggests that,
in the case of apecific investments by one party only, it can be important for efficiency
that the non~nvesting pazty be free to take up opportunities outside the relationship.
Contractual azrangements, or ownership of one party by the other, that inhibit this
could hamper the efficiency of specific investment. An obvious example is alavery. A30
alave ia not in a position to make a choice to work with another slave owner - that is
the prerogative of the slave owner. But the conclusion is not limited to that extreme
example. The same arguments apply to vertical integration of two firms, which could
induce inefficient specific investment by one of them when efficiency could be achieved
by a mazket relationship.
Another implication concerns the question of who ahould undertake the specific
investments when that is something that can be chosen. The robustness of the ef-
ficiency result for the case in which all apecific investments are made by one party
suggests that, wherever it is poseible to choose which party will make those invest-
menta, efficiency may well be enhanced by having them all made by one party.
Our results also have implications for the deaign of legal remedies for breach of
contract. A common view of such remedies is that the law should operate to fill in
appropriate contract terms for contingenciea that the contracting parties did not ex-
plicitly incorporate into their contract. One principle on which this can be done is that
of compensating appropriately a party who makes a specific investment if the other
pazty subsequently refusea to carry co~perate. Breach measures based on com-
pensation make obvious sense if the only concern is with ex post fairness. But, as
Shavell (1980) and Rogerson (1984) recognized, the form of breach measures affects the
inducementa to invest in specific assets. Compensation measures may provide appro-
priate inducements if courts can obtain enough information to asaesa (i) whether it was
actually efficient that trade take place and (ii) what the payoffa to the parties both are
without trade and would have been had trade taken place. Then the courta can ensure
that the investing party is fully compensated only if trade would have been efficient
and this provides the appropriate incentives for investment. But, in the absence of
such information, compensation damages cannot in general induce efficient investment,
as Shavell (1980) and Rogerson (1984) have ahown.
For auch circumstances, the analysis in the preaent paper suggests an alternative
approach to designing breach measurea that can be more effective at achieving efficient
inveatment. That alternative is based not on the principle of compensation for an in-31
jured party but on the principle of preventing one party capturing the marginal returns
to specific investments made by the other. At least in the case of investment by one
party only, all that is required for this ia to ensure that the non-ínvesting pazty ia never
worse off quitting the relationship than staying in it under the terms of the original
contract. The nature of outaide options in bargaining then ensures that this party does
not capture any of the marginal returns to the apeáfic investment. Since to achieve
efficient specific inveatment thia approach requires only enough information to put a
lower bound on the payoff to the non-investing party, it ia much leas demanding of
information than the compensation approach.
There are atill many cases that are not covered by our analyais. Obvíons ones are
those with risk averae parties and those with all the four types of specific investmenta
that we have discussed. The queation of whether market coatracting can achieve ef-
ficient investment in these casea is one that needa further inveatigation.
Appendiz
This appendix givea a proof of Proposition 1. We first characterize the payoffi for
a Mazkov perfect equilibrium on the assumption that auch an equilibrium exiets.
Then, with the use of this characterization, we show that a Mazkov perfect eqnilibrium
does indeed exist. For notational convenience, we define b- ér0. Also, since for the
whole of the renegotiation game the atate m is fixed and known to both partiea, we omit
this argument from the notation where it causea no confusion. Note that an impli-
cation of the definition of a Mazkov perfect equilibrium is that the equilibrinm psyoffa
for the renegotiation game from atage n.0 on can be written
{Vn(Pn-1)' Un(Pn-1)}'
where Pn-1 is the contract in force at the start of roand n. In a similar way, the eqni-
librium payoffs from stage n.l on if agent i(í E{b, s}) has the opportnnity to offer a
new contract at n.l can be denoted
{Vn(Pn-1)' Un(Pn-1)}'
For any contract Pn -{pn, pn, p0} in force at atages n.3 and n.4 of the game,
the flow payoffa per unit of time during the period [n~, (ntl)0] for the action choices
at atages n.3 and n.4 aze given by the matrix in Fignre 3. (Note that the money values32








FIGUflE 3: PAYOFF YATEIZ
Propoeition A.1: For given Pn -{pII, pII, p~}, the payoffs from stages n.3 and
n.4 in any Markov perfect eqnilibrinm aze generically nniqne. The eqnilibrinm flow
payoffs from n~ to (n-fl)A, denoted v(Pn) for the bnyer and no(Pn) for the seller,
aze
v P n P
~v(r)-pá, n(r)tpII], if v(r)-pá ~~n and n(r)tPn ~ PII~
~ (( n) ( n)}
-~-PP~ PF~~ if v(r)~T ~ -pP or n(r)ipT ~ pg. n n n n n n
Proof: For a Markov perfect equilibrium, the payoffs from the beginning of round
n-}-1 do not depend on the strategies chosen at atages n.3 and n.4. It then follows
directly from the payoff matrix in Fig. 3 that, for v(m)-pn ~-pn and u(r~)-~pn ~ pn'
the best reaponses are unique and give the flow payoífs stated. The cases v(r~)-pn -
-pn and u(r~)~}-pn - pn are non-generic. ~
In fact, if both v(m)-pn --pn and u(m)i-pn - pn, the equilibrium payoffs are
unique even though the equilibrium actions are not. In the case v(~}-pn 1-pn and
u(r~)fpn - pn and the case v(~)-pn --pn and u(r~)tpn ~ pn, the equilibrium
payofïs aze not unique because one party prefers to trade but the other is indifferent.
In those cases, the player who is indifferent between the two actions would always wish
the other to believe he or she would choose the action that would hurt his or her
opponent most. For concreteness in what follows, therefore, we adopt as a convention
that no trade takes place under these circumstances.
N N
-pn' pn
Proposition A.2: Let IIs and V~ be any two nnmbets corresponding to a division33
of the ez poet snrplne, that ie U' f V' - S(m)Ir, ior any ~ven m E tI. Thea there
s
e:;sts a contract P (rr) which, if ofiered by one agent at etage 0.1 and acoepted by the
other at stabe 0.2, resalta in s umqne ontoome s~(m) anà payoBs V(~r, :;(m)] - V~ and
s s
U[~, s (r~)] - U írom stage 0.3 on ic~r every Marko. pet4eef eqnilibrinm.
Proof: We consider the two casee v(~)fu(~) 1 vfP (trade ie e~cient) and
v(~)tu(~) c vf~ (trade ia not efficient) separately.
Case (i): v(m)tu(w) ~ vfp. Define the contract P~(~) -{pT~ pN~ p0}
by
(A.1) [v(~) - pT]Ir - V~~
(A.2) -rV' C pN C rU~;
(A.3) v- rV' C pD ~ rU~` -{c.
From the de6nition of S(w) in (3.3), U'f V~ ~ vf~ so this is always poesible. It also
follows from (A.1) and the definition of S(w) in (3.3) that
(A.4) [u(m)fpT]Ir - U~.
Suppose P'(m) is ia force. If renegotiation of P'(m) is rejected, then from
Proposition A.1 the uniqne outcome of stages n.3 and n.4 ie (T, T). Let U, (resp. ~
be the loweat payoff of the seller (resp. buyer) from any Markov perfect equilibrinm
conditional on P~`(m) being currently in force. A feasible strategy for the eeller is to
reject all offers of renegotiation made by the buyer and to offer P'(m) when given the
opportunity to make an offer. Since from (A.3) and (A.4) u(m)tpT ~{~fp0, this
strategy resulta in a payoff greater than (p-FpC)Ir and it must therefore be thst U~
(p-fpC)Ir. Thus, if P'(~) is in force, the eeller is better off choosing R in the cnrrent
period and O in the next period than choosing 0 in the current period. But then, ií the
buyer follows the etrategy of offering P'(~) whenever given the opportnnity to do eo
and rejecting all offers of renegotiation, the eeller will never respond by chooeing O and
the buyer can ensnre that, for the period [n0, (nfl)G], he geta a payoff at the rate of
at leaet [v(m)-pT]. For the period from (ntl)~ on, he gets at leset y. It must
therefore be that34
V ~ i{1-~[v(w)-pT] i- bV.
It follows that V)[v(w)-pT]~r - V' by (A.1). By a similar azgument, by (A.4) U)
[u(w)tpT]~r - U~`. Let Vn(P~) and Un(P') denote the payoffs under P'(w) from any
Markov perfect equilibrium. From the definition of S(w) in (3.3), Vn(P')fUn(P') ~
S(w). By definition of V and U, [Vn(P~), Un{P~`)] )(V, i1) -(V~, U~`). But Vs`fU~
- S(w). Together these imply [Vn(P'), Un(P')] - (V', U~). Thus every Markov
perfect equilibrium has the same payoffs V~ and U' as stated in the proposition.
Case (ii): v(w)fu(w) ( vfp. In this case, immediate separation is efficient. Thus
to obtain the payoffs (U~`, V~`), each agent must select the outaide option in period n-
0 if given the opportunity to do so. Define the contract P'(w) -{pT
pN p0} by
(A.5) (v - p~) - rV`;
(A.6) -v f pC G pN G p f pC;
(A.7) v(w) - v~ p~ G pT G p-F PD - u(w).
This is always possible since v, p~ 0.
First, we ahow that the equilibrium payoffs V~(P~) and UD(P') cannot be such
that VD(P~) G V~ and U~(P~) G U'. To see this, note 5rst that, since (V~, U~`) is
efficient, it must always be that either U1(P') C U~` or Vl(P') ~ V'. Suppose U1(PR)
~ U'. Note also that, under Ps`(w), uo(P`) G~cfpC. Thus the payoff to the seller of
continuing with P~`(w) at n- 0 is strictly less than choosing O if she gets the
opportunity to do so. Then, if the buyer gets to offer a new contract at stage 0.1, the
seller will reapond by choosing O unless the buyer offers a new contract giving the
seller at least U'. That will result in payoffs V~ and U' and, since the buyer can never
get more than V' because the seller will choose O rather than accept a contract giving
her less than U~, the buyer will always offer a contract Lhat induces the seller to choose
O. Thus, V~(P') - V' and U~(P') - U'. If, on the other hand, it is the seller who
has the opportunity to offer a new contract at stage 0.1, the buyer can always
guarantee V~ by responding to any offer by rejecting it and choosing O. Thus, VÓ(P~`)
~ V~. Since Vp(P') -~rV~(P')f(1-a)V~(P~`), it follows that VO(P') ) V`. If,35
altematively, Vl(P') c V', a similar argument ensures that U~(P') ) U~. Thus either
V~(P') ~ V' or U~(P~) ~ U~.
Consider therefore the poasibility that V~(P~) c V~ aad UD(Pt) ~ U~`. Since
V~(P') ~ V' (the buyer caa always rsspend to any offer of the seller by rejecting it and
choosing O), it must be that V~(P') ~ V~` and hence U~(P~) ~ U~. Moreover, since
uo(P') c~fpC, it must also be the case that Vl(P~`) c V' and Ul(P~) 1 U' becanse
otherwise the seller would choose the outside option at time 0, resultiag in V~(P') -
V~. But, by a similar argument, Vl(P') C V~ and Ul(P') ~ U~` implies that Va(P~)
C V~ and Un(P~) ~ U~ for all n. Since v(P~) C v-p~, this meana that the buyer will
always choose the outside option under the contract P' whenever he gets a chance to
do so and therefore Un(P~`) - U~`, and thus Un(P~`) ) U~, for all n. For VD(P~`) c V~
and U~(P~) ~ U' to be an equilibrium there must exist a sequence of numbers Un(P~)
1 U~ such that the seller rejects any contract offered by the bnyer that results in a
payoff less that Un(P') and accepts any contract yielding Un(P~). Un(P~) 1 U' caa
only be attained by continuing the relationehip and so Un(P~`) must satisfy
Un(P') - (1-~u(P~)Ir f ~rafl(P'),
where Un(P~) - aUn(P~)-F(1-~r)UII(P~`). This impliea
Un(P`) - ~[(1-~no(P~`)Ir f óUnfl(P`)J f (i-~)u~.
By solving this difference equation it is straightforward to ahow that, since u(P') t~
f p0 c rUO, the sequence Ua(P') increases without bonnd. But by rejecting every
new contract and taking up the outside option whenever possible, the bnyer can
guarantee himself an amount V~~o. Since Un(P~) ~ S(~)-V(P') ~ S(mr V, then
Un(P~`) cannot increase withont bonnd, which is a contradiction. Together ~vith the
preceding result, this establishes that U~(P~) - U~ and V~(P') - V~`. A symmetric
argument establishea that a Markov perfect equilibrium cannot have V~(P') ~ V' and
U~(P') C U~, which in turn establishes the proposition. ~
This proposition establishes that any division of the ex post surplus between the36
buyer and the seller can be aupported as unique equilibrium payoffs in the
renegotiation game for some contract. Thus, in each period the pazty with the
opportunity to offer a new contract may offer one with unique equilibrium payoffs
corresponding to any division of the surplus. The importance of this is that it implies
that every equilibrium of the renegotiation game ia equivalent to a game in which
agenta offer a division of the surplus and there is no further renegotiation. Thus, in
what follows we need only be concerned with renegotiation over the division of the
surplus at t- 0. We make extenaive use oí this.
Proposition A.3: Snppoee ó[v(~)tn(m)] 1 v-F~. For any contract P-{pT~ pN~
p0} in force at the beginning of ronnd n for which [vo(P), no(P)] -(-~N, pN), the
payoSa to the bnyer and the seller in any Markov perfect eqnilibrinm oí the
renegotiation game are nniqnely given by V(m, P) and II(m, P) defined by
(i-óx)-i.{x(i-a)[S(~)~"] } (i~)(~-~o)},
if óxS(~)-pN c v-p~;
(A.8) rY(m, P) - [1-ó(l~r)]-i.{x[S(~)yr-p0] - (i~r)(1-ó)p8},
if ó(l~r)S(t~)tP8 S l~tPB,
~rS(~)-p8, otherxise;
(A.9) II(~, P) - Sr~ - V(m, P).
Proof: Consider stage n.l of a Mazkov perfect equilibrium with payoffs {Vn(P),
Un(P)} to the buyer and seller reapectively, where P ia the contract in force at the
start of n.l and satisfiea the conditions required in the proposition. Suppose that the
buyer has been chosen by nature to make an offer. If the seller rejects the offer made
by the buyer, the payoff to the seller will be given by:
(A.10) U- max{~~, (1-ó)u rP t bUn}1(P)}
- max{~~, (1-b)P- f óïJn-}1(P)}.
Thia expression states that the aeller gets the maximum of the value of the outside37
option or the value of n(P) over the period n to ntl and then the eqnilibrinm payoff
from nfl on. By Proposition A.1, no trade takes place during round n unless ihe
contract is first renegotiated, so the aeller receives payoff at the rate uo(P) - pN in
round n if any rci.zsed cantract is rejected and the outside option not Laken up. NoLe
that we have used the property of Mazkov perfection when we write the payoff from
round nfi on as independent of the offer made by the bnyer in round n.
If the seller ie to accept the offer of the buyer in any equilibrium, she must
therefore get at least U from the new contract. From Proposition A.2 we know that
the buyer can offer the seller a new contract that will have a unique Markov perfect
equilibrium outcome that splits the surplus in any way desired. Thia haa two
implications. First, it can never be the case that Un(P) - U~ ~ U because the buyer
could offer an effiáent contract that provides the seller with utility U f(U~-U)~2 that
would be accepted with probability one by the seller and yield a higher payoff to the
buyer. Second, by a similaz argument, the buyer will offer only an efficient contract.
Preásely symmetric azgumenta apply to the case in ~vhich the seller makea the offer.
Therefore the contract offered at stage n.l will always be effiáent, so Un(P) - S(w)~r -
Vn(P) for all n. This implies (A.9).
It also implies that, to define the payoffs of the game, we need only define the
payoff to the buyer, V'(P), i E{b, s}. Effíciency implies
Vn(P) - S Í - Un(P), for all n,
and
Unfl(P) - S r - Vntl(P), for all n.
Since Un(P) - U defined by (A.10), it follows that
(A.11) rVn(P) - S(w) - max{({~fp~), (1-~pNfbjS(w) - rVntl(P)J}.
Moreover, by reasoning analogons to that giving (A.10)
(A.12) rVn(P) - max{(v-p~), -{1-b)pN-}.brVntl(P)}.
The payoff in period n.0 is38
(A.13) Vn(P) - ~rVn(P) f (1-a)Vn(P).
In view of this, we may write Vn(P) - F[Vn}1(P)], where F(. ) is continuous and also
increasing because, with ójv(w)tu(w)] 1 vfp, the maximal term in either (A.11) or
(A.12) must involve Vntl(P). Since the game is stationazy with respect to time the
supremum of all the Markov perfect equilibrium payoffs possible from round n on must
be the same as at from round n~l on. Thus we may define
V(P) - sup{Vn(P) ~ Vn(P) is a payoff consistent with some Markov
perfect equilibrium with history P in round n}.
Note that V(P) is bounded. Since F(~) is continuous and increasing, V(P) - F[V(P)].
But the solution to this is unique and, for the case Djv(w)-~u(w)] 1 v~p, is given by
(A.8). Since the infimum over the payoffs must satisfy the same relation, the payoffs
for any Markov perfect equilibrium are unique and satisfy the proposition. ~
In fact, the equilibrium payoffs are unique for v(w)fu(w) ~ vf{~ provided the
other assumptions of Proposition A.3 are satisfied but the formula corresponding to
(A.8) is much more complicated. The reason is that, if ó is not sufficiently close to 1
that ó(v(w)fu(w)] 1 v-}-p, both outside options may bind for some parameter values.
For ó sufficienctly close to 1, at most one of the outside options binds in any period,
yielding the formulae in the propoaition. Since in the text we use only limiting results
as 0-~ 0(so that 6 y 1), we omit details oí the more complicated case.
Proposition A.4: Snppose v(m)fu(w) ~ v-Fp. For any contract P-{pT~ pN~
p~} in force at the beginning of ronnd n for which {v(P), no(P)} -[v(w}-pT,
n(w)tpT], the payoffs to the bnyer and seller in any Mazkov perfect eqnilibrinm of the
renegotiation game are nníqnely given by V(w, P) and U(w, P) defined by39
(1-br)-1.{x(1-b) [S(m)-u(m)~!] t (i~r) (v-PO)},
if v(rr)-p! c v~0;
(A.14) rV(m,P) - [1-b(1-~r)]-1.{x[s(rr)yr~0] ' (1Jr)(1-b)[v(~)-~!]},
if n(~)tP! 5 I~PO:
lv(m) - p!, othervise;
(A.15) U(m, P) - S(m)~r - V(~, P).
Proof: Note that at most one outside option can be binding because trade is
efficient and, by Proposition A.1, will actually take place whether or not the centract is
renegotiated. Thus, ezactly the same proof as for Proposition A.3 applies, except that
now one uses the fact that v(w)-i-uo(m) - S(~) and replaces pN by u(w)tpT in (A.11)
and -pN by v(~)-pT in (A.12). ~
Proposition A.5: Snppoae v(m)-Fu(m) c v}p. For any oontract P-{pT~ pN~
p~} in force at the beginning of round n for which {v(P), no(P)} -[~(m}-pT,
n(~)fpT], the payoffa to the bnyer and eeller in any Markov perfect equilibrinm af the
renegotiation game are nniqnely given by V(m, P) and II(~, P) defined by
(A.16) rV(m, P) -
(1~)-1,{r(1-b) [S(r~)~(~)-P!] t (1-r) (v--PO)},
if a(~)tP! ~ 1~P0i
[1-b(l~r)]-1.{x(v-p0) t (1-x)(1-~[v(~)-P!]},
if ~( rr)-p! ~ v-p0;
v - p0, othervise;
(A.17) U(m, P) - S(~)~r - V(~, P).
Proof: In this case efficiency requires separation, and therefore S(~) - v t p.
Hence at least one oï the outside options must be binding in every period. The result
follows from these observations and from replacing pN by u(~)fpT in (A.11) and ~N
by v(t~~pT in (A.12). ~40
Propositions A.1 to A.5 chazacterize the unique payoffs associated with any Maz-
kov perfect equilibrium if one exists. Thus, for any contract P, the payoffs in any
Markov perfect equilibrium aze uniquely defined by the functions {V(P), U(P)} at the
beginning of any period, and by {Vl(P), U~(P)} if agent i E{s,b} is chooaen to make an
offer. These functions can be used to define strategiea that will constitute a Markov
perfect equilibrium yielding these payoffs as the outcome, thus ensuring existence.
Proposition A.6: A Mazkov perfect eqnilibrinm for the renegotiation game erists.
Proof: Consider the following strategies for round n conditional on Pn-1 being
the contract currently in force:
Stages n.l and n.2: If the buyer has the opportunity to offer a new contract, he
offers a contract P that, if accepted, results in a payoff of Vb(Pn-1). Such a
contract exists by Proposition A.2. The seller accepts (A or AO) all contracts P
giving her a payoff Ub(P) ) Ub(Pn-1) and rejects (R or RO) all others. She
chooses between A and AO, and between R and RO, by choosing the outside op-
tion if and only if pfpn 1 uo(Pn)~-rbU(Pn) when trade is strictly efficient and
choosing that option if and only if pfpn ~ u(Pn)frbU(Pn) when trade is strictly
or weakly inefficient. Symmetric strategies aze played if the roles are reversed.
Stages n.3 and n.4: Agents play the equilibrium atrategiea given by Propoaition
A.1 and receive the associated flow payoffa u(Pn) and vo(Pn).
Since the only relevant history at the beginning of each period is the contract in force,
these strategies define agenta' actions in all possible aubgames. Given the way the
payoffa have been de5ned, they constitute a Markov perfect equilibrium. ~
From these results it is atraightforward to prove Propoaition 1 in the main text.
Proof of Propoaition 1: Existence of a Markov perfect equilibrium follows from
Proposition A.6. For the case v(~)~-u(~) ~ v-~p, it is also the case that á[v(~)fu(~)]
1 vf~ for ~ sufficiently small because b-. 1 as ~~ 0, so Propositions A.3-A.5 cover all
limiting cases. Taking limits of the payoffs in (A.8) as á-~ 1 gives the result for case (i)
of Proposition 1. Taking limits of the payoffs in (A.14) and (A.16) as b-~ 1 similarly41
give the resulta for casea (ii) and (iii) of Propoaition 1. ~
References
Abraham, K. G. and H. S. Fazber, 1987, "Job Duration, Seniority, and Earninga,"
American Ecor~omie Review, 77, 278-297.
Aghion, P., M. Dewatripont and P. Rey, 1989, "R.enegotiation Deaign Undet
Symmetric Information," mimeo.
Alton,p, J. C. and R. A. Shakotko, 1987, "Do Wagea Riae with Seniority?" Revéew
of Economic Studies, 54, 437-460.
Becker, G. S., 1975, Human Capital, The Univeraity of Chicago Presa, Chicago.
Crawford, V., 1988, "Long-Term Relationshipa Governed by Short-Term Contracta,"
American Economic Review 78, 485-499.
Emona, W., 1989, "More on Damage Measurea, Breach of Contract, and
Renegotiation," WWZ Diacuasion Paper 8905, Univeraity of Basel.
Eawaran, M. and A. Kotwal, 1984, "The Moral Hazazd of Budget-Breaking," Rand
Journal of Economics, 15, 578~81.
Fazrell, J. and C. Shapiro, 1989, "Optimal Contracta with Lock-In," American
Economic Review, 79, 51~8.
Green, J. and J.-J. Laffont, 1989, "Contract Renegotiation and the Under
Investment Effect," R.apport Technique 8902, Univeraity of Toulouae.
Grosaman, S. J. and Hazt, O. D., 1986, "The Coats and Benefits of Ownership: A
Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Polilical Economy 94,
691-719.
Grout, P., 1984, "Investment and Wagea in the Abaence of Binding Contracta: A
Nash Bargaining Approach," Econometricn 52, 449~0.
Hazt, O. D. and Holmatróm, B., 1987, "The Theory of Contracts", in Advances in
Economic Theory (T. Bewley, Ed.), pp. 71-155, Cambridge University Presa,
London~New York.
Hazt, O. D. and Moore, J., 1988a, "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation,"
Econometrzca 56, 755-785.
, 1988b, "Property Rights and the Nature oí the Firm," ST~ICERD
Diacussion Paper TE~88~174, Loadon School of Economica.
Holmatrbm, B., 1982, "Moral Hazazd in Teama," T'he Bell Journal of Economics, 13,
324~0.
Huberman, G. and C. Kahn, 1988, "Limited Contract Enforcement and Strategic
Renegotiation," American Economic Review, 78, 471-484.
Joakow, P., 1987, "Contract Duration and Relation-Specific Inveatmenta: Empirical
Evidence from Coal Mazketa," Ame~ican Economic Review, 77, 168-185.42
, 1988, "Price Adjustment in Long-Term Contracts: The Case
o Coal, Journal of Law and Economics, 22, 47-83.
, 1989, "The Performance of Long Term Contracts: Further
Evidence rom Coal Markets," Working Paper 517, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology.
Klein, B., R. Crawford, and A. Alchian, 1978, "Vertical Integration, Appropriable
Rents and the Competitive Contracting Process," Journal of Law and
Economics, 21, 297-326.
MacLeod, W. B. and J. M. Malcomson, 1989, "Implicit Contracts, Incentive
Compatibility, and Involuntazy Unemployment," Econometrica, 52, 447~80.
Mazshall, A., 1920, Principles of Economics, 8th edition, London, Macmillan.
Maskin, E. and J. Tirole, 1988, "A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, I: Overview and
Quantity Competition with Large Fixed Costs," Econometrica, 56, 549-569.
Rogerson, W. P., 1984, "Efficient Reliance and Damage Measures for Breach of
Contract," Rand Journal of Economics, 15, 39~3.
Rubinstein, A., 1982, "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica,
50, 97-109.
Shavell, S., 1980, "Damage Measures for Breach of Contract," The BeU Journal of
Economics, 11, 466-90.
, 1984, "The Design of Contracts and Remedies for Breach,"
Quarterly Journal oj Economics, 99, 121~18.
Shaked, A., 1987, "Opting Out: Bazaars versus "Hi Tech" Mazkets," ST~ICERD
Theoretical Economics Discussion Paper 87~159.
Shaked, A. and J. Sutton, 1984, "Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect
Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, 52, 1351-1364.
Sutton, J., 1986, "Non~ooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction," Review of
Economic Studies, 53, 709-724.
Tirole, J., 1986, "Procurement and Renegotiation," Journal of Political Economy, 94,
235-59.
Williamson, O. E., 1985, The Economic Institutions of Capátalism, The Free Press,
New York.Discussion Paper Series,
No. Author(s)
8801 Th. van de Klundert
and F, van der Plceg
8802 J.R. Magnus and
R. Pcegrgn.
8803 A.A. Weber
8804 F. van der Ploeg and
A.J. de Zeeuw
8805 M.F.J. Steel
8806 Th. Ten Raa and
E.N. Wolff
880~ F. van der Ploeg
8901 Th. Ten Raa and
P. Kop Jansen
8902 Th. Nijman and F. Palm
8903 A. van Scest,
I. Woittiez, A. Kapteyn
8904 F. van der Plceg
8905 Th. van de Klundert end
A. van Schaik
8906 A.J. Markink and






Fiscal Policy and Finite Lives in Interde-
pendent Economies with Real and Nominal Wage
Rigidity
The Bias of Forecasts from a First-order
Autoregressicn
The Credibility of Monetary Policies, Policy-
makera' Reputation and the EMS-Hypotheais:
Empirical Evidence from 13 Countries
Perfect Equilibrium in a Model of Competitive
Arms Accumulation
Seemingly Unrelated Regression Equation
Systems under Diffuse Stochastic Prior
Information: A Recursive Analytical Approach
Secondary Products and the Measurement of
Productivity Growth
Monetary and Fiscal Policy in Interdependent
Economies with Capital Accumulation, Death
and Population Growth
The Choice of Model in the Construction of
Input-Output Coefficients Matrices
Generalized Least 5quares Estimation of
Linear Models Containing Rational Future
Expectations
Labour Supply, Income Taxes and Hours
Restrictions in The Netherlands
Capital Accumulation, Inflation and Long-
Run Conflict in International Objectives
Unemployment Persistence and Loss of
Productive Capacity: A Keynesian Approach
Dynamic Policy Simulation of Linear Models
with Rational Expectations of Future Events:
A Computer Package
Posterior Densities for Nonlinear Regression
with Equicorrelated Errors
A Bayesian Analysis of Simultaneous Equation
Models by Combining Recursive Analytical and
Numerical ApproachesNo. Author(s)
8909 F. van der Ploeg
8910 R. Gradus and
A. de Zeeuw
8911 A.P. Barten
8912 K. Kamiya and
A.J.J. Talman
8913 G. van der Laan and
A.J.J. Talman
8914 J. Osiewalski and
M.F.J. Steel
8915 R.P. Gilles, P.H. Ruys
and J. Shou
8916 A. Kapteyn, P. Kooreman
and A. van Soest
8917 F. Canova
8918 F. van der Ploeg
8919 W. Bossert and
F. Stehling
8920 F. van der Ploeg
8921 D. Canning
8922 C. Fershtman and
A. Fishman
8923 M.B. Canzoneri and
C.A. Rogers
8924 F. Groot, C. Withagen
and A. de Zeeuw
Title
Two Essays on Political Economy
(i) The Political Economy of Overvaluation
(ii) Election Outcomes end the Stockmarket
Corporate Tax Rate Policy and Public
and Private Employment
Allais Characterisation of Preference
Structures and the Structure of Demand
Simplicial Algorithm to Find Zero Points
of a Function with Special Structure on a
Simplotope
Price Rigidities and Rationing
A Bayesian Analysis of Exogeneity in Models
Pooling Time-Series and Cross-Section Data
On the Existence of Networks in Relational
Models
Quantity Rationing and Concavity in a
Flexible Household Labor Supply Model
Seasonalities in Foreign Exchange Markets
Monetary Disinflation, Fiscal Expansion and
the Current Account in en Interdependent
World
On the Uniqueness of Cardinally Interpreted
Utility Functions
Monetary Interdependence under Alternative
Exchange-Rate Regimes
Bottlenecks and Persistent Unemployment:
Why Do Booms End?
Price Cycles and Booms: Dynamic Search
Equilibrium
Is the European Community an Optimal Currency
Area7 Optimal Tax Smoothing versus the Cost
of Multiple Currencies
Theory of Natural Exhaustible Resources:
The Cartel-Versus-Fringe Model ReconsideredNo. Author(s)
8925 O.P. Attanasio and
G. Weber
8926 N. Rankin
892~ Th. van de Klundert
8928 C. Dang
8929 M.F.J. Steel and
J.F. Richard
8930 F. van der Plceg
8931 H.A. Keuzenkamp
8932 E. van Damme, R. Selten
and E. Winter
8933 H. Carlsson and
E. van Damme
8934 H. Huizinga
8935 c. Dang and
D. Talman




8939 W. Gt1th and
E. van Damme




Consumption, Productivity Growth and the
Interest Rate
Monetary and Fiscal Policy in a 'Hartian'
Model of Imperfect Competition
Reducing External Debt in a Wocld with
Imperfect Asset and Imperfect Commodity
Substitution
The D1-Triangulation of Rn for Simplicial
Algorithms for Computing Solutions of
Nonlinear Equations
Bayesian Multivariate Exogeneity Analysis:
An Application to a UK Money Demand Equation
Fiscal Aspects of Monetary Integration in
Europe
The Prehistory of Rational Expectations
Alternating Bid Bargaining with a Smallest
Money Unit
Global Payoff Uncertainty and Risk Dominance
National Tax Policies towarda Product-
Innovating Multinational Enterprises
A New Triangulation of the Unit Simplex for
Computing Economic Equilibria
The Nonresponse Bias in the Analysis of the
Determinanta of Total Annuel Expenditures
of Households Based on Panel Data
The Estimation of Mixed Demand Syatems
Monetary Shocks and the Nominal Interest Rate
Equilibrium Selection in the Spence Signaling
Game
Monopolistic Competition, Expected Inflation
and Contract Length
The Generalized Extreme Value Random Utility





8946 W.B. MacLeod and
J.M. Malcomson
Weak Exogenity in Misspecified Sequential
Models
Duel Capacity Trading and the Quality of the
Market
Identification and Estimation of Dichotomous
Latent Variables Models Using Panel Data
Equilibrium in a Pure Exchange Economy with
an Arbitrary Communication Structure
Efficient Specific Investments, Incomplete
Contracts, and the Role of Market Alterna-
tivesAIYVI~WWN~W~ÍÍIë~Ï~V~II